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PREFACE 
Since the first edition of this work was published in 1956 a number 
of pertinent cases have been decided by the Tennessee courts. This edition 
includes these cases along with the original material still considered to 
be relevant. 
Amendment No. 6 applies to all counties and cities, except those 
cities that elect to be covered by the optional home rule provisions of 
Amendment No. 7. Up to the present 13 cities have elected this option: 
Chattanooga (1972), Clinton (1954), East Ridge (1954), Etowah (1964), 
Johnson City (1955), Knoxville (1954), Lenoir City (1954), Memphis (1963), 
Oak Ridge (1962), Red Bank (1956), Sev!erville (1954), Sweetwater (1955), 
and Whitwell (1958). Note that all except Memphis are in East Tennessee . 
No city has held an election on repeal of home rule status, but the Chat-
tanooga City Commission has approved the recommendation of a charter 
study committee to submit the question of repeal to the voters at the 
general election in November 1976 . 
If municipal officials have questions or problems not resolved by 
the material herein, please call on MTAS for any additional assistance 
needed . 
















The people of Tennessee, on November 3, 1953, approved eight consti-
tutional amendments, the first changes in the document since its adoption 
in 1870. Two of these amendments, numbers 6 and 7, are especially signi-
ficant for the municipalities of Tennessee. The sixth limits the power 
of the State legislature to pass private or special legislation; the 
seventh is the "optional home rule amendment." The complete text of 
No. 6 will be found on p. 10 and No. 7. on pp. 32-33. 
These two amendments were generally referred to in the Convention as 
the "Home Rule Amendments." There was general agreement on the provisions 
of Amendment No. 6 (approved by a vote of 85 to 5), but Amendment No. 7 
was the most controversial issue in the Convention (approved by a vote of 
55 to 36). The importance of the fonner was highlighted by the fact that 
it was the only issue mentioned by Chief Justice Neil, of the Tennessee 
Supreme Court, in an address to the Convention. 1 The latter divided the 
delegates and provoked a great deal of thought and debate. 2 Materials 
ln1 doubt the propriety of my undertaking to give any advice to the 
members of this body .••• But I am frank to say that certain changes 
should be made •••• Over the years there has been too much unwise local 
legislation in which the people affected by it were given little if any 
voice whatever. Many of these private acts had no merit other than to 
serve the basest ends in partisan politics." The Journal and Debates 
of the Constitutional Convention (Knoxville: Bureau of Public Adminis-
tration, The University of Tennessee, 1953), p. 392. Hereinafter 
referred to as Debates • 
~. Fletcher: " •• this question of home rule, I spent more study 
on it than on all the other five subjects before us, combined." Debates, 
PP• 949-950. 















and suggested drafts for an amendment were furnished by the Tennessee Mu-
nicipal League, and its representatives maintained close working rela-
tionships with members of the Convention. Although its proposals were re-
vised, the League unquestionably was a major influence in the delibera-
tions of the Convention, and it contributed substantially in achieving 
acceptable compromises on very difficult issues. 
In view of the interest of the League in this matter, the following 
atatement was obtained from Herbert J, Bingham, the League's Executive 
3 Secretary: 
City officials should proceed cautiously and only for 
good cause in considering whether to become a home rule 
municipality under Amendment No. 7. The pros and cons should 
be carefully weighed in relation to each city's own circum-
stances. 
The League supported Amendment No. 7 as a means of en-
abling those cities that need to do so to escape harrassment 
by hostile political forces in control of local legislative 
delegations. Even though subject to local veto under Amend-
ment No. 61 such delegations can still pass private acts 
that are narrowly partisan, punitive, and disruptive of 
sound local government. And they can absolutely block amend-
ments to a city's charter by refusing to introduce private 
bills. In ra'~ instances emergency amendment of a charter 
plicated question that has been before this Convention. • • • It affects 
all the county governments and all the city governments, and you may say 
that it is not only new, it is rather novel to Tennessee." Debates, 
pp. 962-963 • 
Mr. Hill: "I 8111 convinced that there is not a delegate on this floor 
sufficiently advised of all the complex and far-reaching implications of 
that most uncertain and illusive term 'home rule' to draft a broad and 
comprehensive amendment on the aubject ••• the uncertain limits and 
broad implications of which. no one has presumed to be able to describe 
with any degree of certainty." Debates, p. 964. . 
Pres. Cooper: "I think the Committee on Home Rule has had more dis-
aention and more disagreement than any committee of the Convention. • , 
They have had a far more complicated question, a question that involves 
far 1ROre information •••• " Debates, p. 974. 
3 See also an editorial in Tennessee Town & City (official magazine 












• • • • • • 
may be needed before the next session of the General Assembly. 
Under such circumstances a city may be well-advised to go · 
under Amendment No. 7. It may then amend its charter entirely 
by local action, subject to the limitations stated in the 
Amendment. 
As I see it the principal disadvantage of electing to 
be covered by Amendment No. 7 is the inability of a city to 
secure amendments to its charter through private acts, es-
pecially with respect to taxing powers. Taxes on hotel ac-
commodations in Gatlinburg, on cigarettes and liquor in 
Memphis, and on amusement admissions in Knoxville, are a 
few examples of auch private acts. New taxing power• can 
be acquired very easily by private acts through a coopera-
tive legislative delegation, but may be extremely difficult 
to obtain through general acts. Although this League, through 
the statewide cooperation of municipal officials, has been 
able to win from the General Assembly virtually every neces-
sary authority for municipal governments, its two most notable 
failures came in efforts to expand the taxing power of ml111i-
cipalities. 
The small city may find that going under Amendment No. 7 
is the only way to obtain needed charter changes. The typi-
cal small town has less than one per cent of .the total vote 
cast for its State Senator, and few cities have over 10 per 
cent. The voters in these towns and cities are thus com-
pletely helpless at the polls and cannot, with their few 
votes, insure election of legislators with a sound platform 
for their city or defeat those hostile to their city govern-
ment. Some senators have as many as 15 towns and 6 counties 
in their district and can veto (by refusing to enact) a 
change in any or all of these local governments, however 
much it may be locally supported. 
Short of adoption, Amendment No. 7 may be useful in 
securing prompt and fair consideration of municipal charter 
requirements from a local legislative delegation on the 
basis: if the local charter changes required are not 
enacted, a community can protect its interests through the 
adoption of optional home rule and charter change locally; 
faced with the possibility of thus losing control over a 
aunicipality, a legislative delegation might become more 
cooperative • 
Any city ahould give this matter careful consideration 
before electing to go under Amendment No. 7. One good fea-
ture is that a decision is not irrevocable, as reverse action 
aay be ·taken if experience under this Amendment is unsatis-
factory--home rule status aay be terminated by a majority 
vote in an election for this purpose • 
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construction. As stated by one authority, "in those states where home 
rule has failed, failure has resulted primarily from the attitude of the 
4 
state courts." The Tennessee cases up to this time seem to indicate. solid 
judicial support for the objectives and concepts of the constitutional con-
vention . 
4 Wallace Mendelson, "Paths to Constitutional Home Rule for Municipal-
ities," 6 Vanderbilt Law Review 66, December 1952. Dr. Mendelson partici-
pated in the convention's drafting work, as a consultant to the Tennessee 




















FUNCTIONAL ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES 
Amendment No. 6 
This amendment applies to all municipalities except those that have 
voted to go under Amendment No. 7. A city should consider whether the 
degree of home rule that No. 6 affords is adequate before electing to be 
covered by No. 7. 
5 
Under Amendment No. 6 no private act may be passed "having the effect 
of removing the incumbent from any municipal or county off ice or abridging 
the term or altering the salary prior to the end of the term for which 
such public officer was selected." 
Any other private act must contain a provision that it will not be-
come effective unless approved by two-thirds of the legislative body or 
by a majority of those voting in an election, in the city or county 
affected. Numerous acts have been noted which circumvent this require-
ment through the device of a narrow population or other classification 
that includes only one city; if challenged in court most of these acts 
probably would be invalidated. 
Advantages 
1. Interference with the term or salary of any municipal officer by 
private act is prohibited. No such private act can be passed. 
2. Ne~ded charter amendments can be obtained by private act very 
•imply through cooperative senator(s) and representative(&) in the General 
Assembly. 
3. Taxing powers may be conferred on a city by private act. Little 
difficulty is usually encountered on such an act sponsored by a local leg-
6 
• islative delegation, as contrasted with general tax laws that often provok' 
II 
statewide opposition in the Legislature. Cities under Amendme~t No. 7 
•ust rely on general tax laws. 
' • ' 4. The general public uy be uninformed or apathetic on charte"r changes that are complicated and technical. In such cases more reasona-
II 
i; 
ble, intelligent action might be taken by a 81Dall group (legislative dele-•. 
• gation and city legislative body) who can and will devote more time and study to such utters, as compared with the election procedure under Amend-
II • ment No. 7 • 
• Disadvantages 1. Private acts may be passed which affect the tenure or salaries of 
II employees (as distinguished from officers); however, any such act would 
II not be effective until given local approval as provided in the act, by one 
of the two methods prescribed in this amendment • 
• 2. No charter amendment can be obtained if the local legislative del-
II 
egation refuses to sponsor it. Cooperative relationships between a city 
administration and a legislative delegation will be necessary if legisla-
tion needed by the city is to be passed. 
), A legislative delegation could pass private acts which may create 
serious problems for a city. Poor legislation could result from an atti-
tude that "the final decision ia to be 11111de by the city--let them worry 
about it." Multiple elections also could be required by the terms of pri-
vate acts, which might create undue public controversy having unnecessarily 
devisive effects on a community. 
4. The General Assembly could determine the salaries of municipal 
officers and employees by general acts, and any private acts inconsistent 
.. 
7 
II therewith probably would be invalidated. .. 5. The possibility exists, though remote,.that private bills spon-' eored by a cooperative legislative delegation would not be passed by the .. -( ! I General Assembly or would be vetoed by the Governor. 
! 
II 
6. Effecting charter changes through private acts will be viewed by 
some people as less democratic than the election method under Amendment 
II No. 7 if the method of approval is by the legislative body. 
I- 7. The prohibition against removal from office or abridging the 
II term of an officer, if literally applied, could block bona fide desirable 
II 
reorganizations (such as changing the form of government). 
Amendment No. 7 
II If this amendment is to apply a city must take the initiative by or-
• dinance to call for an election on the question, "Shall this municipality adopt home rule?" If a city's charter provides for initiating ordinances, 
• such an election could probably be called for by the petition procedure if 
II 
the city legislative body does not act. 
After a city has elected to go under Amendment No. 7, and until it 
• elects to abandon home rule by an election, no private act of any kind may be passed for that city. The amendment requires the General Assembly 
• to act with respect to the city "only by laws which are general in terms ..... ···~.::_-..,_.,_ ... .. . --- -
• and effect." The ~ossibility also exists, as under Amendment No. 6, of the so-called general act applicable by a narrow population classification 
• to only one city which is in fact a private act, but it would seem to be 1mlikely that such an act would be sustained by the courts •. 
• Advantages 
• 1. No private acts of any kind may be passed. Therefore, a private • I 
... 1 




• • •• 
8 
act affecting the tenure or salary of an employee, as well as that of an 
officer, is prohibited. 
2. The city may amend its own charter, by popular vote, and is not 
dependent on the local legislative delegation in the General Assembly. 
The city legislative body can initiate changes by ordinance. 
3. The General Assembly could fix the salaries of municipal officers 
and employees by general acts, but such general acts would apply in home 
rule cities only to the extent that they are not inconsistent with charter 
provisions . 
4. Charter changes can be accomplished without requiring approval by 
the General Assembly and the Governor. 
5. It can be said that charter changes are truly democratic, because 
they must be approved in elections open to all voters in a home rule muni-
cipality. 
6. Reorganization of a municipal government could be accomplished by 
locally-approved charter changes, free of possible restrictions in Amend-
ment No. 6 on removing incumbents or abridging terms of officers. 
Disadvantages 
1. The city loses the relatively simple procedure of securing desired 
charter changes through private acts. 
,. 
2. Amendment of the charter is fairly cumbersome, especially if a 
charter commission is elected instead of proposal by ordinance. 
3. A city's taxing powers may not be enlarged by private acts. For 
example, had Memphis been a home rule municipality the 1955 private act 
empowering that city to levy a 3 per cent tax on liquor and a cigarette 
tax of 1¢ per package could not have been enacted. 
- 9 - 4. Public interest is notably apathetic in referendum elections on details of governmental operations. Frequent referendums and low voting 
- petcentages can permit special interest groups to dominate such elections. 
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CHAPTER III 
SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS OF AMENDMENT NO· 6 
The full text of this amendment is reproduced below. On the folloW-
ing pages its provisions are analyzed in detail, in the order in which 
they appear in the amendment. 
Be it resolved, That Article XI, Section 9, of the Con-
stitution of the State of Tennessee be amended by adding at 
the end of said Section as it now reads, the following: 
The General Assembly shall have no power to pass a 
special, local or private act having the effect of removing 
the incumbent from any municipal or county off ice or abridg-
ing the term or altering the salary prior to the end of the 
term for which such public officer was selected, and any act 
of the General Assembly private or local in form or effect 
applicable to a particular county or municipality either in 
its governmental or its proprietary capacity shall be void 
and of no effect unless the act by its terms either requires 
the approval by a two-thirds vote of the local legislative 
body of the municipality or county, or requires approval in 
an election by a majority of those voting in said election 
in the municipality or county affected. 
* * * 
What is a municipality? 
This amendment applies to "any municipal or county office" and to a 
"municipality or county." No questions· should arise as to the meaning of 
"county office" and "county," but the words "municipal office" and "munici-
pality" may be subject to interpretation. It may be aaaumed that a "munic-
ipal office" would exist only in a "municipality," 10 attention will be 
directed to the latter • 
"A municipal corporation" has been defined as "a body corporate 











• • • • • • • • 
II~ 
11 
· district incorporated. 115 In a case arising under the Utility District 
Act of 1937, the court aaid: "It is elementary that the Legislature may 
call such bodies what it pleases. . . Here it has chosen to make pro-
vision for the creation and operation •• of a somewhat new and quite 
limited in scope corporate instrumentality. 116 The City of Memphis is an 
example of how terminology can vary; as a municipal corporation it was 
abolished in 1879, but the next act of the same legislative session re-
created it as a "taxing district." Subsequently it was re-deoignated as the 
"City of Memphis," and the usual powers of a municipality were granted by 
numerous private acts • 
Cases in other states have held the following to be "municipalities" 
or "municipal corporations": sewer district, school board or district, 
housing authority, and utility district. The following have been held 
not to be in this category: drainage district, improvement district, ir-
rigation district, school district, board of water commissioners, and 
board of park commissioners • 
Two Tennessee cases indicate that the word "municipality" is likely 
to be construed to mean only incorporated cities and towns. In Fountain 
City Sanitary District v. Knox County Election Commission, 203 Tenn. 26, 
308 S.W.2d 482 (1957), the court held that this amendment did not apply to 
that district, even though the creating private act called it "a munici-
pality or public corporation in perpetuity" (the general law under which 
most utility districts are organized also declares that any "district so 
128, 
5state v. Knoxville, 115 Tenn. 175, 90 S.W. 289 (1905) • 
6 First Suburban Water Utility District v. McCanless, Com'r., 177 Tenn. 
146 S.W.2d 948 (1941) • 
II 12 
II ,. ·1 
incorporated shall l>e a 'municipality' or public corporation in perpetuity"). 




reproduced in the Tennessee Code Annotated, includes "Home Rule for cities . . 
and counties," and that "unless there is to be ignored the word 'cities' 
II I in the lead line--and the court has no right to ignore it--the word 'mu-
II 
nicipality' used continuously in the body of the Act 'allst be construed as 
meaning a municipality within the general understanding of what is a 'city.'" 
• Justice Swepston, in a concurring opinion, noted that in the Journal of the Constitutional Convention, from pages 1038 through 1059, "the word 'cities' 
II and the word 'counties' are used throughout the discussion and the word 
: 
II , 
'municipality' appears only two or three times. There is not the slightest 
indication that there was any thought in the minds of the different speak-
II ers of any type of municipality other than a 'city' of one or the other 
II 
class." One Justice dissented, expressing an opinion that the sanitary 
district should be regarded as a municipality within the meaning of the 
II· amendment. , 
In Perritt v. Carter, 204 Tenn. 611, 325 S.W,2d 233 (1959), the 
•· amendment was held inapplicable to a special school district, the court observing that although it was a public corporation "yet it was not a 
municipal corporation in the sense that it can be authorized to impose 
taxes." 
* * * 
The General Assembly shall have 
no power to pass a special, local 
or private act having the effect 
























municipal or county off ice or sbridg-
ing the term or altering the salary 
prior to the end of the term for 
which such public officer was selected, 
Denial of power 
The Tennessee Supreme Court, in the case of Shelby County v. Hale, 
200 Tenn. 503, 292 S.W.2d 745 (1956), emphasized that the key words of 
this amendment are "shall have no power," and that this prohibition ex-
tends to "legislation which has the e'ffect of (1) removing an incumbent 
13 
from a county or municipal office, (2) abridging the term of such officer 
or (3) altering the salary of such office during the term thereof." It 
struck down an act increasing the salaries of Shelby County commissioners 
during their terms which had been 'Unanimously approved by the Quarterly 
County Court and had been sustained by two chancellors sitting in bane, 
commenting that "if we were to adopt this construction [that approval by 
the county court saved the act] ••• by learned and able Chancellors, 
we would in effect be wholly eliminating the words 'the General Assembly 
shall have no power ••• ' from the section." 
Who is a "public officer"? 
The above provision applies to "any municipal or county office" and 
to "such public officer," meaning a person filling "any municipal or 
county office." In Ross v. Fleming, 211 Tenn. 255, 364 S. W. 2d 892 (1963), 
holding that a county attorney is an officer under this amendment, the 
















In deciding whether a particular employment is an of-
f ice within the meaning of the Constitution or statutory 
provisions, it. is necessary that each case be determined 
·by a consideration of the particular facts and circumstances 
involved; the intention and subject matter of the enactment, 
the nature of the duties, the method by which they are to 
be executed, the end to be attained, etc. 
The line between the public office and the public em-
ployment is sometimes not too clearly marked by judicial 
decisions. One of the criteria of public office is the 
right of the officer to claim the emolument of eaid office 
attached to it by law. Another one of the criteria of pub-
lic off ice is the oath required by law of the public of fi-
cials, ••• another the bond required by law of certain 
public officials. But in determining the question of whether 
or not this Act under consideration creates an office or 
employment it is not necessary that all criteria be present, 
however, it has been held on good authority that tenure, 
oath, bond, official designation, compensation and dignity 
of position may be considered along with many other things. 
Questions may arise as to which persons in a municipal government are 
"public officers." The Tennessee courts have said that a mayor, a judge, 
a city physician, 7 a city manager, 8 a paymaster, 9 and a marshal or consta-
ble10 are officers. At one time policemen were held to be "officers, "11 
but a later decision held that a "policeman is not an officer," and "cer-
12 
tainly it cannot be said that a fireman is an officer." However, a chief 
of police is an officer. 13 
7Wise v. Knoxville, 194 Tenn. 90, 250 S.W.2d 29 (1952). 
8state v. Thompson, 193 Tenn. 395, 246 S.W.2d 59 (1952). 
9aenniger v. Memphis, 120 Tenn. 555, 111 S.W. 1115 (1908). 
lOPesterfield v. Vickers, 43 Tenn. 205 (1866). 
11 
Porterfield v. State, 92 Tenn. 2R9, 21 S.W. 519 (1893); Cornet v. 
Chattanooga, 165 Tenn. 563, 56 S.W.2d 742 (1933). 
12wise v Knoxville, supra. 
















From the foregoing it is apparent that it would be very difficult to 
devise a definition that would answer this question as applied to all posi-
tidns. Probably most individuals working for a municipal gove-rrunent would 
be classified as "employees." "Employees and •ubordinatea having no duties 
to perform other than those directed by the head of the department or chief 
officer ••• do not hold public offices, but their functions are rather 
in the nature of contracu of employaent."14 
May private legislation alter salaries of employees? 
A COllllllOn practice, in the years before this amendment, was the enact-
ment of private legislation to increase the salaries of certain personnel, 
•uch as teachers, policemen and firemen, in a particular city. Would the 
language of this amendment prohibit such legislation? 
The answer to this question would appear to be negative for personnel 
classified by the courts as "employees," as contrasted to "officers," 
within the meaning of this amendment. Kost municipal employees do not 
serve definite "terms" but are employed under civil service regulations or 
serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority, and therefore the pro-
vision "altering the salary prior to the end of the term" would appear to 
be inapplicable. Any such act would, of course, be ineffective unless 
locally approved as the amendment requires. 
The word "selected" encompasses popular election, appointment (or 
election) by a municipality'• governing body, and appointment by a mayor 
or other official, Cases construing the meaning of "select" aake it 
















equivalent to "elect" and appoint. 1115 It was indicated in the convention 
16 that this was the intended meaning. 
Effect on reorganization or change in form of government 
Certain changes in the form or structure of a municipal government, 
which might otherwise be accomplished by a private act charter amendment, 
might be blocked by the prohibition against "removing the incumbent" or 
"abridging the term" of an officer "prior to the end of the term for which 
such public officer was selected." For example, would this provision pre-
vent a change from commission to mayor-council government, prior to expire-
tion of the commissioners' terms? 
This would be an especially difficult problem where the commissioners, 
or other officers, serve for overlapping terms. Could a waterworks board 
be abolished and its functions be transferred to a board responsible for 
all municipally-owned utilities? If auch a board is composed of five 
members serving overlapping five-year terms, would the effective date have 
to be postponed to the termination of the longest terms remaining to be 
served, and if so what would be the terms of other members during this time? 
Would the freedom of choice formerly enjoyed by voters of a city, to 
change their form of government, be cancelled by the impossibility of doing 
so without affecting some officer's term of office? It is entirely possi-
ble that a literal, rigid application of this provision would have such an 
effect. Dicta in Shelby County v. !!.!1!.• 200 Tenn. 503, 292 S.W.2d 745 (1956), 
15xresser 
128 Hise. 642, 
2d 312 (1945). 
v. Fitzsimmons, 68 N.Y. 514 (1878); Bareham v. Rochester, 
220 N.Y.S. 66 (1927); Jackson v. Coxe, 208 La. 715, 23 So. 


















indicstes that this provision might be so literally applied. 
Consideration might be given to the possibility that the courts could 
consider "abridge the term" and "abolish the office" as two different ac-· 
tions, although the latter would have the effect of abridging the term. 
McQuillin says that a "valid removal may result from the abolition of an 
office, place or position. • • • The abolition of an office .has been said 
not to constitute a 'removal' of the incumbent. 1117 Against this view, 
however, is an opinion by the Tennessee Supreme Court sustaining a chan-
cellor's holding that a_private act violated Article XI, section 9, be-
cause it "abolishes the office of justices of the peace for those districts 
created by said 1953 Act and as a matter of law has the effect of remov-
18 ing said officers from office." 
It may be noteworthy that two early drafts in the Convention (Reso-
lutions 29 and 59, the former by Mr. Pope, the chief architect of Amend-
ment No. 6) limited the power to abolish only if another similar office 
were created by the same session or if the voters petitioned for a ref-
erendum. It may also be significant that later drafts dropped any ref er-
ences to "abolish" or "abolition"; perhaps this was considered superfluous, 
assuming that such action would be within the meaning of "having· the ef-
feet." Many drafts were introduced, and only one after Resolutions 29 and 
59 contained any reference to abolition of an office--this was proposed 
by Mr. Miller and Mr. Tipps and included the clause "which abolishes or 
creates an office." 
l7McQuillin Mun. Corp. (3rd ed.), sec. 12.246. 
18Byrd v. Rhea County, 207 Tenn. 62, 338 S.W.2d 545 (1960), 
I 
... 







Comments by two delegates in the convention, however, indicated that 
they viewed this language as a prohibition, under any circumstances, against 
a~olition of an office before the end of the incumbent'& term: 
Mr. Dodson: And in these boards and commissions, as 
a general rule, the terms of the selected officers of those 
boards and commissions are staggered so that one will expire 
say in 1953, and another one in 1954, and another one in 
1955, 1956, and 1957, and so on. Now, Sir, would the effect 
of this first paragraph be to freeze those men on those com-
missions and boards for the length of the longest term of 
the man on the board, or not? 
Mr. Fletcher: In my opinion, it would. 
Mr. Dodson: It would? 
Mr. Fletcher: Yea, that is the difficulty. It is one 
that we saw no way to get around; I can only say this, that 
the general result of this provision will result in 10 much 
benefit that occasional difficulties, and there would be 
occasional difficulties in some particular city or county, 
would have to be borne. That is the only answer I can give, 
Mr. Dodson: 
rule could obviate 
is that right? 
Mr. Fletcher: 
, • no city that adopted optional home 
that difficulty by making the adoption; 
That would be my opinion. 19 
Mr. Pope [explaining Amendment No. 6]: , •• that 
resolution simply means this, that the legislature cannot 
under any circumstances pass an act abolishing an office, 
changing the term of the office or altering the salary of 
the officer pending the term for which he was selected; 
that is prohib0ted, and that kind of an act cannot be passed. • • , 2 
Viewed against the background of the private act 1ystem as it existed 
prior to 1953, described by former Chief Justice Neil of the Tennessee 
Supreme Court as "too much unwise local legislation in which the people 
affected by it were given little if any voice whatever •••• these pri'·.!te 
l9Debates, p. 1039. 
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acts had no merit other than to serve the basest ends in partisan poli-
tics, u2l it seems possible that the courts could make a distinction be-
tween such acts and those effecting a bona fide reorganization of a 
19 
municipal government, especially if the form of local approval is by pop-
ular referendum. The so-called "ripper bills" that the constitutional 
convention sought to outlaw had been bills enacted by the General Assembly 
with no local approval whatsoever, and generally such bills had been 
22 aimed at particular individuals. 
Effect on charter recall provisions 
The question of whether this amendment outlaws charter recall provi-
aions was answered in the negative by the Tennessee Court of Appeals, the 
court observing that the incumbent commissioner "has not been removed from 
office by said recall petition [but] has merely been aubjected to the 
hazard of a new election, the risk of which he assumed when he accepted 
office under the provisions of the Charter of Union City. • • • "23 
A possible means of circumventing this provision 
It should be noted that this prohibition is against passage of a 
"special, local or private act." This would not prevent the classification 
of municipalities according to population and the enactment of general 
21 Debates, p. 392 • 
22see Catherine Fox Siffin, Shadow over the City (The University of 
Tennessee Record, Extension Series, Vol. XXVII, No. 3, June 1951). The 
research was a project of U.T.'s Bureau of Public Administration. 









legislation applying only to a particular class. 24 However, there must be 
a reasonable basis for the classification. 
'. 
In Frazer v. Carr, 210 Tenn. 565, 360 S.W.2d 449 (1962), the court· 
sustained the enabling act under which the Nashville-Davidson County Metro 
charter had been adopted, holding that the provision making it applicable 
only in counties with more than 200,000 population was valid "because we 
all know that it is in these large counties that the problem of the large 
cities as to the ever increasing population just beyond the corporate lim-
its becomes more acute, complex and confusing." In the 1ame case an amend-
ment of 1961 to the Metro act which authorized establi1hment of a charter 
commission by private act, and a 1ubsequent private act creating auch a 
commission for Nashville and Davidson County, were sustained on grounds 
that the 1961 amendment was "applicable to every county which falls within 
an admittedly reasonable classification." The test is whether the class 
is reasonable, not that only one city or one county is affected. 
An act amending TCA 6-202 applicable only to a "city having a metro-
politan form of government" was attacked on grounds that it was a private 
act in effect because only Nashville had that form of government; in re-
jecting this challenge the court said, "it is quite apparent that this Act 
applies throughc ,~ the State to all those who desire to come within its 
25 
purview." 
The so-called "general" act, applying to a very narrow population 
bracket including only one city, is a familiar disguise for a private act, 
24 
Luehrman v. Taxing District, 70 Tenn. 425 (1879); ~ v. State, 90 
Tenn. 407, 16 S.W. 471, 13 L. R. A. 183 (1891). 
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and has been sustained by the courts in the past (such acts have been pub-
lished in the volumes labeled "Private Acts"). The Tennefsee Supreme Court, 
id upholding a "general" act that by a population claasification applied 
only to Montgomery County, said: 
However far fetched might seem the rule, and however 
vicious may be considered the practice which produces laws 
through legislative courtesy by force of the will of the 
representatives for a single county, the doctrine that 
classification by reference to the Federal census if other-
wise unobjectionable is permissible cannot be repudiated 
after long adherence of its application in adjudicated cases 
sustaining certain Statutes upon particular subjects. It 
could not be repudiated without producing more or less 
confusion in every county of the State. Personal and prop-
erty rights would be measurably a~fected and the resultant· 
confusion would be injurious to t'he State. The doctrine 
of stare decisis commands adherence to the rule. ,26 
In State v. Turnpike Co, 133 Tenn. 446, 181 S.W. 682 (1915), the 
court described as undesirable a situation that has become the pattern 
for most Tennessee cities (excluding those organized under general law 
charters): "If classification by population were deemed permissible of 
adoption for every purpose, each county and municipality may for its gov-
ertllllent be provided with a distinct code of laws, general in mere form, 
but specific or local in substance and fact." 
This point is discussed in greater detail in the following analysis 
of Amendment No. 7 (see pp. 38-41; note also Lawler v. Mccanless, briefed 
on pp. 23-24). 
Salary changes 
Past decisions have indicated that changes in salaries of officers 
could be effected only at the beginning of the next terms of office. In 
26iJ111iams v. State, 155 Tenn. 364, 293 s.w. 757 (1927) • 
.. 
• • • ~ 
• • • • • • • 
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Shelby County v. Hale, 200 Tenn. 503, 292 S.W.2d 745 (1956), the court held 
that a county officer's salary could not be changed during his term of of-
fice, even though the private act had been approved by the local governing 
body; the defense had argued that the latter part of Amendment No. 6 was 
an exception to the former part, but the Supreme Court held otherwise • 
However, this doctrine may be partially modified by recent legislation (not 
yet tested in court) providing for escalator increases for judges and other 
officials based on cost of living indices. 
A question that may arise is whether the legislation must be enacted 
before an election is held, rather than after an individual has been elected 
to an office but before his term begins. In the latter case, technically 
the salary change would not take place during his term of office but it 
would obviously be for the benefit of a person already elected. 
Another approach to this problem would be the omission of salaries 
from private act charters altogether and the delegation of this authority 
to a municipality's governing body, coupled with a like restriction that 
no salary changes may be made during an officer's term of office. This 
would place the determination of salaries in the hands of the locally 
elected representatives of the citizens-of a municipality. Some advantages 
that might be claimed for this approach would be greater flexibility, in-
creased responsiveness to local public opinion, and more consistency with 
the-principle of home rule. Furthermore, the General Assembly would be 
freed from the necessity of having to make numerous policy decisions as to 
salaries for a large number of municipal offices. Such an arrangement, 
however, would be subject to criticism that members of the governing body 
























R * * 
and any act of the General Assembly private 
or local in form or effect applicable to a 
particular countv or municipality either in 
its governmental or its proprietary capacity 
shall be void and of no effect unless the 
act by its terms either requires the approval 
by a two-thirds vote of the local legislative 
body of the municipality or county, or re-
quires approval in an election by a majority 
of those voting in said election in the munic-
ipality or county affected. 
23 
The effect of this provision is to give each county and municipality 
a veto power (either by action of its governing body or by a referendum) 
over any private legislation affecting it. It applies to !1l private 
acts, including any of the type mentioned in the foregoing discussion. 
For example, an act raising employees' salaries could become effective 
only upon local approval by one of the two methods provided. 
"in form or effect" 
These are the crucial words of this clause (with probably the same 
•aning as "in terms and effect" used in Amendment No. 7, discussed in 
folloving pages). In passing on an act that purported to make the General 
Sessions Court of Gibson County a State court by enlarging its jurisdic-
tion and paying a portion of the salary from the State treasury, the 
court observed that it was an "amendatory Act applied, by population 
,, .. .. 24 
classification, to Gibson County alone" (without any provision for local .. i t' approval), and that because it was "local in effect" it "violates Article 
,; .. 4 11 XI, Section 9, of the Constitution of our State and is void. 11 27 
Delegate authority to city governing body .. A city planning to continue to operate under a private act charter 
II aay be well advised to secure, whenever possible through friendly legiala-
tive delegations, the adoption of charter amendments phrased in general 
II terms. If the powers are expressed in broad and general terms, if the 
II 
determination of what offices are to be established and their aalariea, 
functions, and the like are left to the governing body of the city, and 
II if, in general, a lllinimum of restrictions are imposed and aaximum author-
ity is delegated to the city council, then the occasions for legislative .. enactments ahould be very much reduced. Once a city is in this po1ition, 
II 
it may re1ist future intrusions by unfriendly legislative delegations 
through the power of the legislative body or voters to disapprove private .. acts. 
Alternative methods for local approval 
This provision makes any private act for a particular city "void and 
of no effect" unless it requires approval (1) by "a two-thirds vote of the 
local legislative body" or (2) "in an election by a majority of those vot-
ing in aaid election." The method of approval must be apecified in "the 
act by its terms," thus placing this responsibility in the General Asaem-
bly which, under the practice of "courtesy" followed so consistently, act-













ually places it in the hands of the local legislative delegation. A county 
or city may request one or the other method, but it is solely within the 
discretion of the General Assembly (local legislative delegation) to 
decide. 
In a few counties, as in Knox County, there has been some controversy 
as to the respective powers of a county commission established by private 
act and the quarterly county court. The convention debates indicate a 
clear intention that this authority would be vested in the quarterly county 
court; a proposal to change the term "local legislative body" to "local 
governing body" was voted down, and on this point Mr. Pope had this to say: 
• • • we changed that word advisedly and carefully • • • 
there is a real controversy in those counties like Hamilton, 
as to what is the governing body of that county; and the 
Supreme Court decision has been many times or several times 
that we know of, that the Quarterly County Court composes 
and makes up the legislative body for that county •••• 
. there would be a controversy in certain counties where they 
have both of these bodies, and there would be a question 
as to what was the governing body; and we think that clearly 
the word "legislative" ought to be written in it.28 
What is meaning of "two thirds vote"? 
The language, "two-thirds vote of the local legislative body," could 
mean: (1) two-thirds of the total number of places, including vacancies; 
(2) two-thirds of the existing membership, excluding vacancies; (3) two-
thirds of the members present at a meeting, when one or more are absent 
but a quorum is present; (4) two-thirds of those voting when one or more 
present are recorded as not voting and the favorable vote is two-thirds 
of a quorum; or (5) two-thirds of those voting when one or more present 












are recorded as not voting and the favorable vote is less than two-thirds 
of a quorum. 
Cases might be found to support any of the above interpretations: 
The Supreme Court of the United States, in a case involving the 18th Amend-
ment and an interpretation of the constitutional provision that "The Con-
gress, whenever two-thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall 
propose Amendments to this Constitution," said: "The two-thirds vote in 
each House which is required in proposing an amendment is a vote of two-
thirds of the members present--assuming the presence of a quorum--and not 
a vote of two-thirds of the entire membership, present and absent. 11 29 
In the case of Doyle v. Torrence, 203 Tenn. 175, 310 S.W.2d 425 (1958), 
• 
the Tennessee Supreme Court has given an interpretation of this provision. 
This involved a private act for the City of Nashville; 19 of the total 
membership of 21 were present, eight voted for the act, two against, and 
nine abstained. Noting that the Constitutional Convention had adopted 
Robert's Rules of Order as its governing parliamentary authority, the court 
referred to section 48, p. 204, and quoted the following: 
Two-thirds Vote. A two-thirds vote means two-thirds 
of the votes cast, ignoring blanks which should never be 
counted. This must not be confused with a vote of two-
thirds of the members present, oi two-thirds of the members, 
terms sometimes used in by-laws. To illustrate the differ-
ence: Suppose 14 members vote on a question in a meeting 
of a society where 20 are present out of a total membership 
of 70, a two-thirds vote would be 10; a two-thirds vote of 
the members present would be 14; and a vote of two-thirds 
of the members would be 47. 
The court observed that the case required interpretation of the lang-
uage "two-thirds vote of the local legislative body," and concluded that 













this fell under the last example quoted above from Robert's Rules of Order, 
which in the instant case meant "two-thirds membership of the 'local leg-
i•lative body' ••• would be 14." This decision was reinforced by the -. 
following: 
It is noted that on pages 1121, 1122, 1123 and 1124 
of the judicial proceedings of the Limited Constitutional 
Convention this question came up for discussion. In this 
discussion Mr. Pope was just as positive that the language 
was clear and unambiguous and meant "two-thirds vote by 
the Local Legislative Body, that means, and I don't think 
it could mean anything else than two-thirds of the full 
membership of that body." Others in the discussion at the 
Constitutional Convention had a different idea. It was 
finally concluded though, in this Constitutional Conven-
tion, that the provision as submitted to the people would 
not be changed or added to but that they would just agree 
after the discussion was had about it that it meant as Mr. 
Pope had interpreted it to mean. 
Of course this discussion of the members of the Limited 
Constitutional Convention on this question is not binding on 
us but it has long been settled in this State that if there 
was any doubt about the meaning of the Constitution that those 
having doubt about it had the obligation first of examining 
the proceedings of the Constitutional Convention which has 
adopted this provision and see from the proceedings what the 
framers of the resolution intended it to be. The first case 
that applied this ruling was State v. Cloksey, 37 Tenn. 482, 
decided just one hundred years ago. 
The Tennessee Court of Appeals has ruled on a case involving a pri-
vate act for Henry County which received approving votes of 11 members 
of the Quarterly County Court; two passed, two were absent, and three 
positions were vacant. Reversing the chancellor, the Court of Appeals 
construed the language of this amendment as requiring approving votes of 
two-thirds of the total number of squires authorized for the Quarterly 
County Court (in this instance, 18), and held that the act was not prop-
erly approved because it failed to receive at least 12 affirmative votes. 
A petition for certiorari was denied by the Tennessee Supreme Court in a 










MajoritY when a joint election is held 
The alternative to approval by a legislative body, which may be 
•pecified in the private act, is "approval in an election by a majority 
of those voting in said election in the municipality or county affected." 
When such an election is held simultaneously with another election, 
the question might arise, as it has arisen in other states, whether this 
provision would require a majority of all the votes cast for candidates 
and/or on all issues on the ballot, or simply a majority of those votes 
cast on the question of approving the private act. Some cases can be 
found which might seem to lend some support to the former view, but they 
have involved unusual constitutional or statutory requirements in most 
instances. The weight of authority seems to be in favor of the latter 
view: that only a majority of the votes cast on the question of approv-
ing the·private act would be required. The following discussion in the 
Convention also supports this view: 
Mr. Miller: ..• suppose the legislature submitted 
this bill for approval in a general election, under your 
wording would that not require a majority of all voting in 
that general election to approve, rather than a majority 
voting on a particular bill? 
Mr. Pope: No, sir it would not; I don't think there 
is any doubt about that. 
Mr. Miller: Aren't we leaving a loophole for the 
court to construe that to mean you would have to have a 
majority of all voting in the election to approve the 
bill? 
Mr. Pope: All I could say was if I was on the court 
action has been taken before publication of the bound volume of acts. The 
1974 volume contained 11 such statements; seven for acts that set no dead-
line for local action, one set a deadline of September 1, 1974, and three 
called for referendums in the regular August 1974 election, on November 4, 
1974, and on the third Tuesday in May 1975 • 
.. .. f 
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I certainly would not construe it that way, but I don't 
1ee how there can be any question when you say "•aid elec-
tion," that is election to this same thing .••• 
Mr. Miller: To cl•rify it, couldn't we •ay voting 
thereon. . . . 
Mr. Pope: Well, it wouldn't hurt, I think. 
Mr. McGinness: Let's avoid cluttering it up now with 
little immaterial .1111endments •••• I don't think the •ug-
gestion he made is well taken; I think it is clear •• , .32 
Section 157 of the Kentucky Constitution prohibits any city froa in-
curring an indebtedness above its annual income "without the asaent of two-
thirds of the voters thereof, voting at an election to be held for that 
purpose." Construing this provision, the Kentucky Court of Appeal• •aid: 
"It is conceded that the proposed bond issue received the assent of tvo-
thirds of those voting on the question, but not the assent of two-thirds 
of those voting at the election. At first the court was inclined to the 
view that the assent of two-thirds of those voting at the election was 
necessary. • • • But that and other cases announcing the •ame doctrine 
was •ubsequently overruled . . • and it now may be regarded as finally 
settled that the constitutional requirement is fully met by assent of two-
thirds of those voting on the question."33 
The Missouri court reached the same conclusion. "The first point 
urged is that two-thirds of all voters of Kansas City 'voting at an elec-
tion to be held for that purpose' (Const. 1875, sec. 12, art. 10) failed 
and neglected to. vote in favor of the issuance of the bonds .••• two-
thirds of all persons who voted at the general election, held at the aame 
32Debates, pp. 1122-1123. 
3Jiiall v. Elizabethtown, 200 Ky. 321, 254 S.W. 893 (1923). 
• • • • 
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time and places, did not vote to issue the bonds •••• [held to) mean 
two-thirds of those who actually vote for or against the given proposi-
31 
ti'on, whether such two-thirds be two-thirds or not of all the voters tak-
ing part in the election otherwise. • • • u34 
The Kentucky and Missouri constitutions contain the phrase "to be 
held for that purpose," which ia missing from the Tennessee provision. 
However, the context of the Tennessee amendment and particularly the words 
"in said election" would seem to indicate a very clear intention that an 
election would be held for such a purpose. The Kentucky and Missouri 
"voting at an election" is so close to the Tennessee "voting in ·said elec-
tion" that no distinction in meaning would seem to be possible. As the 
Indiana court said: "If, from the language of the statute [or constitu-
tion], it is intended that a special vote shall be cast upon a proposi-
tion, and the law does not expressly require the majority of the votes 
cast at the general or regular election to adopt the measure, then it 
aatters not whether the votes are cast at the same poll as is used for 
the election of officers. All that is necessary in such case is that the 
measure should receive a majority of the votes cast for or against 
i 1135 t. • . 
34 
ltansas City v. Orear, 277 Ko. 303, 210 S.W. 392 (1919). 
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SUMMARY.AND.kNALYSIS OF AMENDMENT NO. 7 
This is the "optional home rule amendment," reproduced in full bel9w, 
On the following pages its provisions are analyzed in detail, in the order 
in which they appear in the amendment . 
Be it resolved, That the Constitution of Tennessee be 
amended by adding to Section 9 of Article XI the following: 
Any municipality may by ordinance submit to its quali-
fied voters in a general or special election the question: 
"Shall this municipality adopt home rule"? 
In the event of an affirmative vote by a majority of 
the qualified voters voting thereon, and until the repeal 
thereof by the same procedure, such municipality shall be 
a home rule municipality, and the General Assembly shall 
act with respect to such home rule municipality only by 
laws which are general in terms and effect. 
Any municipality after adopting home rule may continue 
to operate under its existing charter, or amend the same, or 
adopt and thereafter amend a new charter to provide for its 
governmental and proprietary powers, duties and functions, 
and for the form, structure, personnel and organization of 
its government, provided that no charter provision except 
with respect to compensation of municipal personnel shall be 
effective if inconsistent with any general act of the General 
Assembly and provided further that the power of taxation of 
such municipality shall not be enlarged or increased except 
by General Act of the General Assembly. The General Assem-
bly shall by general law provide.the exclusive methods by 
which municipalities may be created, merged, consolidated 
and dissolved and by which municipal boundaries may be al-
tered. 
A charter or amendment 118Y be proposed by ordinance of 
any home rule municipality, by a charter co11DDission provided 
for by Act of the General Assembly and elected by the quali-
fied voters of a home rule municipality voting thereon or, 
in the absence of such act of the General Assembly, by a 
charter coDDDission of seven (7) members, chosen at large not 
more often than once in two (2) years, in a municipal elec-
tion pursuant to petition for such election signed by quali-
fied voters of a home rule municipality not less in number 
than ten (10%) per cent of those voting in the then most re-

















131, 350 S.W.2d 601 (1961), involving interpretation of a subsequent pro-
vision in this amendment for election of a charter commission. 
St~te laws on special elections 
State election laws seem to provide sufficient guidance to hold a 
home rule election as contemplated by Amendment No. 7. The Tennessee Su-
preme Court has held that the state election laws apply to municipal elec-
tions39 and the sweeping language of present State law (TCA 2-103), com-
prehensively revised in 1972, clearly includes such elections: "All elec-
tions for public office, for candidacy for public office, and on questions 
submitted to the people shall be conducted under this title." 
Who may initiate a home rule election? 
In view of the specification that the question of whether to adopt 
home rule is to be submitted "by ordinance," it would appear that the mu-
nicipal legislative body (council, commission, board of aldermen, etc.) 
ie the sole authority which may initiate an election. The only exception 
would seem to be that the people could do so when a city charter provides 
for initiating an ordinance by petition. The language of Amendment No. 7 
is that "Any municipality may by ordinance •••• "; the amendment does not 
stipulate that "The legislative body of a municipality may by ordinance" 
submit the question. However, Mr. Sims, in explaining this provision to 
the Convention, said, "it means ••• an ordinance adopted by its legislative 
3911The election laws of the State ••• come within this class of gen-
eral State-wide laws, applicable to municipalities, as well·as other sub-
divieiona and arms of the State government. • • • To permit enactment of 
special election laws in the different municipalities of the State would 
utterly destroy the essential uniformity of our entire election system and 
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Frequency of holding elections 
The amendment is silent as to the frequency of holding elections to 
vote on whether to sdopt home rule. It might be said that a municipal 
governing body, or the people by initiative, could order such elections 
with excessive frequency to vote home rule in or out (the second paragraph 
provides for "repeal thereof by the same procedure"). The good sense of 
the citizens and governing body of a municipality, plus the expense of 
holding such elections, should be a sufficient guarantee against such abuse . 
Meaning of "qualified voters" 
Amendment No. 7 empowers a municipality to submit the question of 
adopting home rule "to its qualified voters." The words "qualified voter," 
used as a qualification of a candidate for office, do not mean the same as 
when used as a prerequisite to voting. In the former sense it has been 
held that a person need only meet the constitutional requirements and need 
not be a registered voter.41 The reference here obviously means the "qual-
ified voters" who are entitled to vote in an election, and in this sense 
the Tennessee courts have ruled that a person must be a "registered voter. 1142 
As in other elections, then, only "registered voters" would be permitted 
to vote on the question of adopting home rule. 
* * * 
In the event of an affirmative 
40Debates, p. 1010. 
41Trammel v. Griffin, 141 Tenn. 139, 207 S.W. 726 (1918). 




















vote by a majority of the quali-
fied voters voting thereon, 
There seems to be little doubt as to the meaning of this clause, and 
no possibility of disagreement as to its interpretation. The word "there-
on" clearly refers back to "the question: 'Shall this municipality adopt 
home rule?'" Under the discussion of Amendment No. 6 cases were cited to 
the effect that only a majority of those voting on a particular question 
ii needed, if the question is submitted at a general election in which can-
didates for office and_possibly other questions are on the sam~ ballot 
(1ee pp. 2~-31 ) . There should be no doubt that an "affirmative vote by 
a majority of the qualified voters voting thereon" can mean only a major-
ity of those voting on this particular questi~n. 
and until the repeal thereof 
by the same procedure, 
This provision permits a city to terminate home rule by the same pro-
cedure previously outlined for adopting home rule; that is, submission by 
ordinance to the qualified voters at a general or special election on the 
question: "Shall this municipality repeal home rule." An affirmative vote 
of the qualified (registered) voters voting on this question would result 
in termination of home rule, and the provisions of Amendment No. 7 (except 
the three sentences to be noted later) would no longer apply to the munic-
ipality. Its charter would remain the same until amended, subject to the 
provisions of Amendment No. 6. 
* * * 
such municipality shall be 




After a favorable vote on the question of adopting home rule, and 
"until the repeal thereof," the status of the municipality is that of a 
~'home rule municipality." As such it vill be subject to, and vill be ·en-
-
titled to, the rights and privileges of the provisions of Amendment No. 7 
and any legislation thereunder. 
* * * 
and the General Assembly shall 
act vith respect to such home 
rule municipality only by laws 
vhich are general in terms and 
effect. 
Type of legislative action 
The vords "shall act vith respect to" vould seem to be all-inclusive, 
covering any type of action. All legislation affecting a "home rule •unic-
ipality" in any vay, then, must be "general in terms and effect." These 
are the key words in the entire amendment, as to the means of legislative 
control over a "home rule municipality." It seems obvious that the inten-
tion was to prohibit private acts altogether. Whether this necessarily 
follows depends on the construction given by the courts. 
The possibility of a legislature circumventing a prohibition against 
special legislation through the device of "general" leghlation applying 
to very narrow population brackets has been discussed in the foregoing 
analysis of Amendment No. 6 (see pp. 19-21 ). As an example, an act 
might be drafted as a "general" act to apply to all municipalities having 
a population of 174,000 to 175,000, according to the 1970 or any subsequent 
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census was 174,587, and no other city would fall within this bracket. The 
b II 1
11 i it 11 t II b h ld b f act would e genera n s erms, ecause t ere wou e no re erence 
to the City of Knoxville, but the words "and effect" should invalidate 
the act. 
Early in the home rule movement the New York Court of Appeals defined 
the critical role of the courts in this respect: "We must go farther and 
inquire whether (the act] is general or local 'in its effect.' Home rule 
for cities, adopted by the people with much ado and after many years of 
agitation, will be •• -. a form of words and little else, if the courts 
in applying the new tests shall ignore the new spirit that dictated their 
adoption. The municipality is to be protected in its autonomy against 
the inroads of evasion. 1143 In another case an act general in its terms, 
applying to all cities with a population over 1,000,000 (New York City 
only was affected), was declared invalid under the New York Home Rule 
44 
Allendment because it was not "general both in terms and in effect." 
We have found only one case decided since adoption of the amendments 
in 1953 which gives a clue to the court's position on this point, and it 
is encouraging. An act which by a population classification applied only 
to Gibson County, and therefore was not made subject to local approval un-
.. r Amendment No. 6, was thrown out because it was not general "in effect. 1145 
lffact of classifying cities 
We have taken note of the past practice of classification on a popu-
43In re Elm Street in City of New York, 246 N.Y. 72, 158 N.E. 24 (1927). 
44 
Osborn v. Cohen, 272 N.Y. 55, 4 N.!.2d 289 (1936). 
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lation basis to make an apparent general act apply only to one city, and 
that this could be a device to circumvent the constitutional prohibition 
46 'against special or private legislation. 
Early in the Convention several proposals were made to prevent auch 
subterfuges: by fixing the number of classes, the minimum number of cities 
in any class, or the population limits of the classes. These were not 
accepted, primarily because it was felt that this would have unduly cir-
cumscribed the discretion of the General Assembly. However, many delegates 
spoke against the practice, and none defended it, clearly indicating a 
consensus of the Convention that circumvention of this provision through 
the device of the single city population bracket should not be permitted. 
Mr. Sims made this explanation to the Convention, with regard to with-
draval of restrictions on classification of cities: 
•• that particular part of the resolution was intended 
merely to prevent a subterfuge, and was completely ancillary 
to the prohibition of private legislation as affecting munici-
palities •••• the legislature has the right, and has been 
classifying cities. I felt we vent too deeply into that, and 
this restores to the legislature its own judgment and leaves 
the question purely one to be determined by the court as to 
whether or not it is a private or general act ••.• 47 
It is possible that general laws, incorporating a bona fide classifi-
cation of home rule municipalities on a population basis, could apply to 
one city only or to a very few cities in each class. This would be the 
result if a relatively small number of municipalities vote to become "home 
46
Acts applying to counties with populations of 25,000 to 25,100, · 
12,980 to 13,000, and 25,907 to 25,909, respectively, were sustained in 
Murphy v. State, 114 Tenn. 531, 86 S.W. 711 (1904), Taylor Theater v. 
Mountain City, 189 Tenn. 690, 227 S.W.2d 30 (1950), and Wilson v. State, 
143 Tenn. 55, 224 S.W. 168 (1919). 

















rule municipalities." For example, general legislation applying to "home 
rule municipalities" might be passed for those in population brackets of 
under 5,000, 5,000 to 15,000, 15,000 to 100,000, and over 100,000, accord~ 
ing to the last Federal census or any subsequent Federal census; this would 
probably be a classification free of any taint of private legislation in 
disguise, but if only one city in any bracket had voted to become a "home 
rule municipality" it neceasarily would be the only one affected. But it 
might be questioned that legislation applying only to "home rule munici-
palities" is "general" legislation. There could be no objection 1f gen-
eral laws apply to all cities in a reasonable population bracket, instead 
of being restricted to "home rule municipalities." 
The extent of protection against legislative action that would be 
afforded by electing to operate under Amendment No. 7 seems to depend on 
two factors: (1) whether the General Assembly is disposed to pass "gen-
eral" acts that are actually private through the device of classification 
by population, and (2) whether the courts sustain such acts as being 
"general in terms and effect." 
* * * 
Any municipality after adopting 
home rule may continue to operate 
under ita existing charter, 
This language is clear enough. The existing charter is left undis-
turbed. An important point to note is that the existing charter may no 
longer be amended or repealed by a private act of the General Assembly, 
although it may have been a charter enacted by private act; Changes may 
take place only by action of the 111UDicipality under subsequent provisions 
of this amendment, or by general laws that supersede the city's charter 
42 
(this point is discussed later on). 
* * • 
or amend the same, or adopt and 
thereafter amend a new charter 
to provide for its governmental 
and proprietary powers, duties 
and functions, and for the form, 
structure, personnel and organi-
zation of its government, 
This clause empowers a muni~ipality, by following the procedure out-
lined in a subsequent section, to determine on its own initiative its 
"powers, duties and functions, and ••• form, structure, personnel and 
organization of its government." This is a broad grant of authority, and 
would seem to encompass any matters normally found in municipal charters, 
but it is subject to the important exceptions discussed under the aucceed-
ing two clauses. The sweeping nature of this grant was indicated by two 
Convention delegates: 
Mr. McGinness: Now, a municipality has, as I have 
stated, only such powers as are expressly delegated to it; 
then, if this resolution be embodied in our Constitution, 
it would have all power except insofar as it might be re-
strained by general laws. This is not academic; it is 
fundamental. In my view, it is a dangerous innovation. • .48 
Mr. Sims: After you get under the optional plan, ye~ do 
not acquire any powers except those which are not contrary 
to the general acts or any future general acts of the legis-
lature •••• 49 
48 Debates, p. 959. 

















"' "' "' 
provided that no charter provision 
except with respect to compensation 
of municipal personnel shall be ef-
fective if inconsistent with any 
general act of the General Assembly 
General acts supersede charters of home rule municipalities 
43 
The above clause makes any general law prevail over a home rule munic-
ipality's charter to the extent that the latter is "inconsistent" with the 
former, "except with respect to compensation of municipal personnel." 
Thus the municipality's charter is supreme as to compensation but must 
defer to general laws on all other matters. 
The reference is to "any general act" and not simply to general acts 
passed with respect to home rule municipalities. Nor is it limited to 
general acts passed after adoption of the amendment. Accordingly, it ap-
pears that the charter of a home rule municipality cannot be "inconsistent" 
with any provision of a general act a ~P~~d before or after the amendment 
became effective, except as to "compensation of municipal personnel." 
Said Mr. Miller to the Convention: "I want to make it clear that no mu-
nicipality can act in regard to any matter either of local or of state-
wide concern if the state itself has already entered the field by general 
law, and preempted that field by an inconsistent provision or regulation. 1150 
The word "inconsistent" is subject to interpretation. Direct con-
flict with a general act would seem to be prohibited, but would a standard 

















in a ptivate act, as in the field of public health, be "inconsistent" if 
more severe than the standard of a general act? If the general acts are 
•silent on a particular point, may the point be covered by a home rule· 
charter provision? May a new c.orporate power, such as power to own and 
operate a municipal bus system, be added? 
In one case it was held that a city could not prevent the sale of 
milk that had passed minimum State tests. "Any ordinance which it aay 
enact • . must be reasonable and not in conflict with the general law.n5l 
In another case, under a statute authorizing cities to impose higher 
than State standards on milk and milk products sold within their limits, 
the Court said: 
An ordinance enacted in the exercise of police power 
is not necessarily inconsistent with a State law on the 
same subject because the city provides for greater re-
strictions or makes higher standards than is provided or 
made by statute. Walker v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 95 Kan. 
702, 149 P. 677 •••• But in doing so the city may not 
pass an ordinance which ignores the State's own regulatory 
acts, or deny rights granted by the State or grant rights 
denied by the State and thus in effect nullify the State 
law. 52 
The City of Lincoln, Ne~raska, governed by a home rule charte• adopted 
under a constitutional grant which permitted it to "frame a charter for 
its own government, consiste~t with and subject to the constitution and 
laws of this state," passed an ordinance prohibiting the sale of liquor 
to minors. A state law also prohibited such sales, but had the added qual-
ification "knowing them to be such," so that a vendor might escape on a 
plea and-proof that he did not know the buyer was a minor. The court held 
51Nashville Pure Milk Co. v. Shelbyville, 192 Tenn. 194, 240 S.W.2d 
239 (1951). 
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that the two provisions were not inconsistent, that both were directed 
toward the same legislative purpose and the city ordinance was simply a 
"stricter regulation," and that the word "inconsistent [as] used in a 
sense applicable to legislation [means] contradictory in the eenee of 
45 
legislative provisions which cannot coexist, not mere lack of uniformity 
in detail. "S3 
An ordinance providing for city tax liens, adopted by Lubbock, Texas, 
under its home rule charter, was sustained as not being inconsistent with 
the general laws of Texas which provided for liens only for state and 
county taxes. As illustrations, the court said a city could adopt supple-
mentary methods of collecting taxes, or could restrict motor buses to 
certain streets, or could fix telephone rates in the absence of a atate 
law on this subject, but could not fix a different or more ell:tensive pen-
alty for crime than that fixed by general laws; the opinion defined "in-
con1iatent" to mean "in conflict with" and "repugnant to. 11 54 In another 
caae from Texas, the Federal courts sustained a provision in Dallas' home 
rule charter which provided for tax liens to attach aa of January l each 
year as not being in conflict with a general law providing that the attach-
ment would occur at the time of assessment.SS 
A Florida case held that a general law authorizing the governing body 
of a municipality to issue bonds for street improvements simply by reso-
lution was not "inconsistent" with a provision in the city's special act 
charter requiring a two-thirds favorable vote of the electors to approve 
53Bodkin v. State, 132 Neb. 535, 272 N.W. 547 (1937) • 
54In re Robertson, 20 F. Supp. 270 (1936). 
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any bond issue.56 
In passing on whether a provision in an act repealing all prior laws 
"incc;>nsistent" therewith actually repealed a prior act on the same aubje.ct, 
the Supreme Court of New Jersey said: 
The courts do not favor repealers by implication • . • 
when two entirely different schemes or methods or procedure 
are provided for by the two, it will be presumed that the 
Legislature was cognizant of that fact. • • • If it was in-
tended ••• to destroy the one, it would have said so by 
express words. • •• The dictionary meaning of inconsistent 
is logicslly incompatible; contradictory; inharmonious • 
• • • The methods of procedure are not inconsistent. They 
are different, it is true, but they may exist side by side.57 
The supremacy of general acts under this clause would seem not to ex-• 
tend to those general acts which are optional for adoption by municipalities. 
In Mink v. Memphis, 222 Tenn. 216, 435 S.W.2d 114 (1968), the court held 
that a provision in an optional general law which required notice and a 
hearing to remove members of a housing authority board did not apply, but 
instead the provisions of the city charter would govern. On the other 
hand it seems unlikely that a city could adopt a different provision from 
that found in TCA 6-1003, requiring written notice within 90 days after 
an accident if a suit is to be brought against a city for injuries alleged 
to be incurred· on account of negligent conditions of streets or sidewalks. 
Very limited protection against general acts 
This clause would enable the General Assembly to pass truly general 
acts that are not constitutionally prohibited, affecting home rule munic-
ipalities in any way except as to compensation of municipal personnel. 
Atl. 
56 Lake Alfred v. Lawless, 102 Fla. 84, 135 So. 895 (1931) • 
57oakland v. Board of Conservation and Development, 98 N.J.L. 99, 118 
787 (1922). 
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Of course this would not be a result of becoming a home rule municipality, 
because the General Assembly may do likewise with a municipality that haa 
no~ elected to come under Amendment No. 7. The home rule municipality 
would have the added protection that no general act .could override a 
charter provision relating to compensation of its personnel, a benefit 
not enjoyed by the non-home rule municipality. Mr. Sims, in the Conven-
tion, gave this explanation: " ••• the legislature cannot under the 
amendment pass a law to force • • the city to pay minimU1D salariei to 
the employees that are hired by that particular city. 1158 
It should be noted that it must be a charter provision to benefit 
from this protection--a general act could supersede an ordinance provision 
relating to compensation but it could not override a charter provision. 
A charter provision that all salaries shall be fixed by ordinance would 
probably assure protection against any general act interference, without 
actually fixing the amounts of compensation in the charter--generally 
conaidered to be an undesirable feature. 
Meaning of "compensation" 
The word "compensation" is universally interpreted to include sal-
ariea and wages. Does the term include "fringe benefits" such as retire-
11ent and pension plans, medical and hospitAlization plans, group life and 
accident insurance, sick leave pay, and ao on? 
General Regulation No. 1 of the U. S. Wage Stablization Board defined 
.... ea, salaries or other compensation" to include "vacation and holiday 
,.J'lletlt•, . . . employer contributions to or payments of insurance or 
SL . 
""Debates, p. 1011. 











welfare benefits, employer contributions to a pension fund or annuity, pay-
ments in kind .. " Court cases have held the following to be compensa-
•tion: an annual cash clothing allowance to firemen; the use of a car· that 
may be withdrawn at the will of _the employer; hospital, medical and surgi-
cal bills paid by an employer; funeral expenses; weekly payments for in-
juries or for total or partial disability; the right to receive hospitali-
zation or medical treatment; and vacation leave with pay. Retirement and 
pension plans have usually been included in this term but occasionally 
have been excluded. 
In a leading case involving group insurance, the Tennessee Supreme 
Court observed that a city without doubt has authority to increase its 
employees' salaries, and, "This, in effect, is what it did when it took 
out said policy of group insurance ••• there can be no objection if, as 
an economic measure, it is to the best interest of the municipalities to 
adopt it. 1159 
In view of the foregoing it would seem likely that the courts would 
hold any such fringe benefits to be "compensation," including such items 
as uniforms and equipment furnished to city employees. If so, it would 
mean that charter provisions of a home rule municipality would prevail in 
the determination of salaries and any other remunerative benefits for 
city employees. 
* * * 
and provided further that the power 
of taxation of such municipality 
shall not be enlarged or increased 





















except by General Act of the General 
Assembly . 
It is obvious that under this clause "the power of taxation" cannot 
be "enlarged or increased" by locally adopted amendments to the charter. 
Thi• IDllY be done only by general act, and we shall see that a subsequent 
provision in this amendme.nt limits the power of the General Assembly in 
thi• respect, even by general act (seep. 62) . 
The General Assembly loses none of its power to control taxation by 
municipalities, 60 but-it is deprived of its power to do so by private 
act• with respect to home rule municipalities. This is a fairly signifi-
cant difference, in that a few legislators almost invariably determine 
tbe fate of private bills, while general bills are subject to more thor-
ouah legislative consideration, the power of pressure groups, etc. 
A city, in becoming a home rule municipality, would be giving up the 
capability of enlarging or increasing its powers of taxation by private 
act. Rumerous private acts have been passed for this purpose in the past; 
a fev will be mentioned by way of illustration. Four cities were author-
taed to levy a retail tax on beer sales by private acts; in the next ses-
aion all cities were authorized to do so by general act. A 1955 private 
ect authorized the City of Memphis to levy reta~l sales taxes on liquor 
... ciaarettes. Gatlinburg and Sevier County were authorized by a 1953 
pri•ate act to levy a tax up to tW'O per cent on amounts paid for lodging 
ec:coamodations at hotels and motels . 
Tba private act system seems to have two virtues in this respect: 
.. 
60such pciwer is complete and exclusively within the province of the 
C...ral Aa1ellbly. Luehrman v. Taxing District, 70 Tenn. 425 (1879); Rail-
~ Y. Barria, 99 Tenn. 684, 43 s.w. 115 (1897) • 
. ~{';.. 
~- . ~:- .. 
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(1) pioneering by a few cities may lead to a general act that could not 
be passed as a general act at the outset, and (2) it is adaptable to the 
peculiar circumstances of a city; the lodging accommodations tax in Gat-
linburg, a tourist center, is a good example. 
• • * 
The General Assembly shall by general law 
provide the exclusive methods by which 
municipalities may be created, merged, con-
aolidated and dissolved and by which munic-
ipal boundaries may be altered. 
Application to all municipalities? 
The Constitutional Convention shifted gears at this point. The en-
tire amendment, except this and two other sentences, by its terms applies 
only to "home rule municipalities." This sentence relates to "municipali-
ties," and there is no qualifying language restricting its application to 
home rule municipalities. It might be contended that Amendment No. 7 was 
the "Home Rule Amendment" and that its provisions were intended to apply 
only to those cities electing to operate thereunder; however, the plain 
meaning of the words seems to be against such a view. The State Attorney 
General's office has given an opinion that this provision prohibits annex-
ation by private acts. 
In addition to the use of the word "municipalities" without the qual-
ifying words "home rule," there is the fact that this sentence comprehends 
municipalities being "created." Obviously an existing municipality, ellg-
ible to become a home rule municipality, cannot again be "created." It 














d " be "create . This application to municipalities not yet brought into 
51 
existence, which obviously could not be "home rule municipalities," is 
80ae -evidence that this sentence was intended to apply to all municipal--
ities. 
The Tennessee Supreme Court has declared that "the real intention 
vill always prevail over the literal sense of terms."61 Therefore, analy-
•i• should go beyond the literal meaning of this sentence. Although 
agreement on intent is not clearly revealed, the Convention Debates pro-
...tde some clues as to the thinking of a few delegates on this point. 
The first home rule resolution (No. 18) that was introduced by Mr • 
Sims, the chief proponent of home rule, contained a provision that "aunic-
ipal corporations • • • shall not be created by the General Assembly by 
8pecial laws ••• [and] The General Assembly shall provide by general 
law the methods by which new municipal corporations may be formed, munic-
ipal boundaries may be altered, municipal corporations may be merged or 
consolidated, and municipal corporations may be dissolved." 
Numerous resolutions on home rule were introduced and many of them 
contained language similar to the foregoing--no material change occurred--
only a condensation to make the sentence shorter. Resolution No. 45, for 
auiple, read, "shall provide by law the methods," and otherwise was 
identical with the sentence finally adopted. The first majority report 
of the Committee on Home Rule included the same language as was finally 
adopted, and this sentence reappeared without change in numerous subse-
'118Dt drafts that eventually became Amendment No. 7 • 
61Michie'a Digest of Tennessee Reports, Vol. 14, page 240, citing 
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Mr. Sims, in a convention speech, made this sti 
to see if we have not • • • given to the people in I 
exclusive method of handling their own affairs in tl 
tion, but leaving to the legislature the broader· p01 
method of organizing municipalities, merging them, 1 
extending their boundaries. 11 62 
Resolution No. 118, without any change, was ev1 
the Convention and by the voters as Amendment No. 7 
the first time incorporated the optional home rule : 
in each municipality. It may be noteworthy that Mr 
creating, merging, consolidating, and dissolving ci 
boundaries, in his initial explanation that this re. 
cities of Tennessee the option of adopting home rul< 
to regulate their own affairs, to amend their own c· 
people in the municipality, and . . remove themse· 
cities by the same process • 1163 
The proponents of Amendment No. 7 were chiefly 
ing all private acts for cities; at least two of th 
Miller, did not look with much favor on the local a 
Amendment No. 6. Their first drafts would have app 
quiring the General Assembly to deal with them by g 
ification into four classes and not less than four 
permitted. When they shifted to the optional basis 
the whole plan then would apply only to home rule D 
62 Debates, p. 915 • 























all kinds of private acts, including those annexing territory, were pro-
hibited only with respect to such 111unicipalities? Oiniuion of the word 
"such" before "111unicipalities" 111ay or uy not have been intentional--it 
could have been an oversight. But this line of thinking leads to ,the 
incongruity of "creating" already existing ho111e rule 111unicipalities, as 
the word "created" also appears in this sentence. 
A conclusion that the provision applies to all municipLlltte.s is 
supported by the Tennessee Supre111e Court's holding in the case of Frost 
v. Chattanooga, 488 S.W.2d 370 (1972), in which a purported "aenetal" 
act with a population classification 111&king it applicable in Hamil.ton 
County only was invalidated because it "was not drafted to create a class 
of 111unicipalities who had similar annexation-taxation problenia with fringe 
population areas, but seeks to clothe a local act for Chattanooga in tet'lllll 
of a general act." The court noted that the "constitution in very clear 
language prohibits the Legislature from prescribing any 111ethod•of alter-
ing 111unicipal boundaries except by general law," and added,. ''we do not 
bold that the Legislature could not act to alter 111unicipal boundaries by 
legislation valid as a general law under the classification doctrine, but 
we are not able to conceive of any circu111Stances where such would be 
valid." 
General acts available for incorporation 
The effect of this provision is that municipalities 111&y be "created" 
(incorporated) only under existing or new general acts. At the present 
time three general laws are available: TCA 6-101 !.t.!!!l.·• providing for 
a aayor-alder111en for111 of government, TCA 6-1801 to 6-2313, for a c01lllllission-
-.nager for111, and TCA 6-3001 to 6-3618, the "modified city 111&nager-council 
54 
charter." The prevailing practice of past years, incorporation by private 
act, is no longer available. 
* * * 
A charter or amendment may be pro-
posed by ordinance of any home rule 
municipality, 
This is the first of three procedures for proposing a new charter or 
an amendment to an existing charter. The governing body may do so by a 
duly enacted ordinance. The people could also do so if a charter provides 
for the enactment of ordinances under the initiative procedure. 
* * * 
by a charter commission provided for 
by Act of the General Assembly and 
elected by the qualified voters of a 
home rule municipality voting thereon 
The second procedure is the election of a charter commission "provided 
for by Act of the General Assembly." The word "Act" standing alone raises 
a question as to whether it could be a private act. Unquestionably the 
General Assembly could provide by gener.al act for the, election of charter 
commissions in all cities electing to follow this route, but could it pass 
a private act for a particular city? The language "a charter commisaion" 
and "a home rule municipality" might be construed in the singular, as an 
intention that such an act could apply to only one city, and that this was 
intended to be an exception to the preceding provision in this amendlllent· 
that "the General Assembly shall act with respect to such home rule aunic-
ipality only by laws which are general in terms and effect." 
The last part of this clause would seem to require that any such act 







of the General Assembly provide for election of charter commission members 
by a majority of the qualified (registered) voters voting thereon in the 
election--although "majority" is not spelled out it 1e clearly implied, 
* * • 
or, in the absence of such act of 
the General Aasembly, by a charter 
commission of •even (7) members, 
choaen at large not more of ten than 
once in two (2) years, in a munici-
pal election pursuant to petition 
for such election signed by guali-
fied voters of a home rule munici-
pality not less in number than ten (10) 
per cent of those voting in the then 
most recent general municipal election. 
This, the third procedure, may be used only "in the absence" of an 
act by the General Assembly providing for a charter commission; if the 
General Assembly passes an act this procedure would no longer be avail-
able. 
The question of whether the whole of Amendment No. 7 can be placed 
1Dto operation by a municipal election without implementing legislation 
bJ the General Assembly has already been considered. Of a similar nature 
la tbia provision authorizing local action to effect charter changes, and 
Oii thia issue we have a clear ruling by the Tennessee Supreme Court that 
lbe provision is self-executing.64 
64waahington County Election Commission v. Johnson City, 209 Tenn. 
' ~' .··• 
i 1 
• I 
• • • • • • • • • .. • 
I 
56 
The language seems to be self-explanatory. Action would be initiated 
by a petition signed by qualified (registered) voters of the city not leas 
in number than 10 per cent of the total vote cast in the "then lllOSt recent 
general municipal election." The specification of "general municipal elec-
tion" would seem to mean a regularly scheduled election, as provided in 
the charter, for the election of officers; it would appear to rule out any 
special election such as one to fill a vacancy or to vote on a bond iaaue, 
etc. "A regular or general election is one which recurs at stated inter-
vale as fixed by law; it is one which occurs at stated intervals without 
any 1uperinducing cause other than the efflux of time. 11 65 "The words 
'general election' ..• when used with reference to city elections, with-
out any qualifying words, must mean the election for municipal officers 
in general. 11 66 
The charter commission members would be elected "at large" (from the 
entire city instead of by wards or districts), in a "municipal election." 
A special election could be called for this purpose only (this was done 
in the Johnson City case), or they could be elected in a municipal elec-
tion held for another purpose. 
To whom would the petition be submitted? The amendment is ailent on 
this point. Would the petition go to the city's governing body, which 
would in turn call on the county election commission to hold the election, 
or would the petition be presented directly to the county election com-
aisaion? The latter procedure probably would apply. Upon aubmiasion of 
131, 350 S.W.2d 601 (1961). 
65Allen v. Tobin, 155 Neb. 212, 51 N.W.2d 338 (1952). 
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•proper petition (if no act has been passed by the Gen~ral Assembly), the 
countY election .commission of the county in which the municipality is lo-
-cated apparently would be responsible for conducting such an election. 
There is nothing in the amendment indicating that the petition should 
first go to the governing body of the municipality, and this would seem_ 
to be a wholly unnecessary procedure. Although this issue was not raised 
in the case, Washington County Election Commission v. Johnson City, supra, 
by implication seems to support this conclusion; in that case the city 
bad asked for an injunction to restrain the election commission from hold-
ing the election. 
* * * 
It shall be the duty of the legis-
lative body of such municipality 
to publish any proposal so made 
The legislative body (council, commission, board of mayor and alder-
MD, etc.) is required to "publish" whatever has been proposed by any of 
tbe three methods outlined above. If an entirely new charter has been 
proposed, it would be the duty of the legislative body to have it pub-
lhbed. 
What is the meaning of the word "publish"? "By reference to Webster's 
lev International Dictionary, the definition of 'publish' is, in part, as 
follow•: 'To promulgate or proclaim, as a law or an edict. To make pub-
lie in a newspaper, book, circular, or the like.' • • A book may be 
•rinted without being published. It is published only when it is offered 
lw eale or put in general circulation. n 67 From another case: "The word 
67Buchanan v. Stamper, 272 Ky. 38, 113 S.W.2d 839 (1938) • 
58 
'publish' means, primarily, to make known, and has the same significance 
as the word 'circulate. 1168 Publication in a newspaper would appear to 
be the most certain way to meet this requirement. It might be possible 
to print the proposal as a newspaper insert which can be removed and re-
tained in pamphlet form (if the amendment is extensive), with an extra 
quantity of the insert being printed for other distribution. 
* * * 
and to submit the same to its 
qualified voters at the first 
general state election which 
shall be held at least sixty 
(60) days after such publication 
What must appear on ballot? 
Although "same" refers back to "proposal," which would be the com-
plete proposed amendment, this would not necessarily imply publishing the 
entire amendment on the ballot (obviously impossible for an extended amend-
mentor new charter). It is customary to summari~e on a ballot the mat-
ter to be voted upon, and quite often a law will prescribe the exact lan-
guage; in the absence of any such prescription in this provision any rea-
sonably clear swmnary of the proposed amendment should suffice. The ballo~ 
language could be included in an ordinance making the proposal, or could 
be drafted by a charter commission; otherwise apparently this would be a 
decision for a county election commission to make. 
A key word here is "submit." One case holds that "a ballot title 



















11 1 cliuse which submits the proposed measure to the voters for their 
idoption or rejection. • • • To submit means to present and leave to the 
Jud11Mnt of the qualified voters. "69 From another case: "We -get little 
belp from cases so far as the cited authorities are pertinent they 
l\lpport the idea that to 'submit' may include more than leaving the bare 
document to the will of the voters. For instance: In re Norton, 75 Miac, 
180, 134 N.Y.S. 1030, 1032, aays: 'In this election everything necea-
aary to reach the judgment of the qualified voters is a part of the sub-
siiiion; that is, all the proceedings preparatory to the election day, 
lllcluding the count of ballots, and the return. "'70 
The obvious purpose of publication in advance of the election is to 
lllfol'11 the public. The complete text of an amendment on the ballot could 
DOt 1erve this purpose, and in the context of Amendment No. 7 it is ob-
Yioua that this was not intended. Perhaps there could be added to the 
lbort ballot title something like the following: "as published in {nam-
1111 D9¥1paper or other medium) on {date or dates)." This should establish 
'-Yood any doubt a tie between the ballot title and the complete proposal. 
ll.ection at which to be submitted 
The proposal is to be submitted at the "first general state election" 
eccarrtna at least 60 days after its publication. "The rule is to exclude 
tbe fint day and to include the last day of the specified period";71 
for aa..ple, publication on September 3 would be 60 days ahead of an 
-
6
'woland v. Hayward, 69 Colo, 181, 192 Pac. 657 {1920). 
7
°iieva Corp. v. Smith, 353 Mo. 845, 184 S.W.2d 598 {1945). 
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election on November 2 (27 days in September, plus 31 in October and 2 in 
November). 
Another point to be noted is the meaning of "general state election." 
Party primaries may be immediately eliminated.72 At the time the amend-
ment was adopted, State law (TCA 2-1201) defined "state elections" to in-
elude "any election held for the choice of national, state, county, or 
district officer or officers." 
Elections of county officers and judge~, held concurrently with pri-
maries to nominate candidates for Governor, Public Service Commission, and 
members of the General Assembly, on the first Thursday in August would 
seem to qualify as "general state elections" when charter proposals can 
be submitted to the voters. November elections for Governor, Public Ser-
vice Commissioners, and members of the General Assembly could also be used 
for this purpose. 
Mr. Sims, in explaining this provision to the Convention, said "it 
further guarantees that amendments cannot be submitted more often than 
once in every two years, because that is when you have your general elec-
tions.1173 
In addition to "state election," this provision has the additional 
qualifying word "general." Although some cases construe a "general elec-
tion" to be one open to all voters, even though to fill a vacancy or to 
vote on a particular question, the usual rule seems to be to classify 
72,,A primary election is not an 'election' within the common accepta-
tion of that term." 29 C. J. S. 15. ". • • primaries are not in reality 
elections but merely nominating devices." Ledgerwood v. Pitts, 122 Tenn. 
570, 125 s.w. 1036 (1910). 
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these as "special elections," as distinguished from regularly 
occurring 
"general elections." A conservative view would be to regard as "g 
1 enera 
.iate elections'' only those occurring at stated time interval~ for the 
election of the officers mentioned above, and to rule out all others as 
''special elections.'' 
* * • 
and such proposal shall 
become effective sixty (60) 
days after approval by a 
majority of the qualified 
voters voting thereon. 
Only a simple majority of those "voting thereon" is required. It 
vould be expected that many voters casting ballots in a "general state 
election" would not vote on a charter proposal, but a majority of the 
total vote would not be needed--only a majority of those voting on this 
particular question. As to counting the dayR, the same general rule as 
•tated above would seem to apply; "generally, time 'after' an act is 
c09puted by excluding the day on 1.'hic!i the event took place. 11 74 
The question may arise as to when the 60 days begins to run. When 
doe• "approval"--the "event"--take place? On the day of the election, or 
wben the vote is finally counted or offi~ially canvassed? The answer 
9i0Uld seem to be that "approval" takes place on the day of the election, 
m:id that the day following is the first of the 60 days. Construing an 
Oreaon constitutional provision, under which an employers' liability act 
lllad been adopted by the initiative procedure, in a case involving an 
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accident on the day following the election, a Federal court 1aid: 
A law proposed by the initiative ••. would take ef-
fect from and after the date of its approval, unless other-
wise declared therein. . • • The law is adopted or rejected 
at the time the vote is cast, and not when the official can-
vass is made. It may be suggested that under this view a 
law may in fact be in force without those affected thereby 
being aware of it; but this may be and often is true of acts 
of Congress and other law-making bodies which take effect 
from and after the date of their passage.75 
* * * 
The General Assembly shall not authorize 
any municipality to tax incomes, estates 
or inheritances, or to impose any other 
tax not authorized by Sections 28 or 29 
of Article II of this Constitution . 
Application 
This is the second sentence in the amendment that applies to all 
aunicipali ties of the state. The language "any municipality" seems to be 
explicit enough. The Convention Debates also leave no doubt on this point. 
Nearly every draft contained such a provision, and every delegate who 
spoke on this point indicated a definite intention that !!£. municipality 
ahould be permitted to levy ~uch nefarious taxes. Said Mr. Manheim, refer-
ring to Mr. Pope's argument that the effect of Resolution No. 105 would be 
to empower the legislature to levy an income tax and to authorize any 
aunicipality to levy such a tax: "I assure you that none of us who 1igned 
Resolution No. 105 had the slightest intention of granting additional 
75Bradley v. Union Bridge & Construction Co., 185 F. 544 (1911). A 
aillilar holding is found in Elsas v. Missouri Workmen's Compensation Com-






















Powers of taxation to anybody. So, we can quickly dispose of thi b • o jec-
tion by redrafting the proposal in language that will leave no doubt vbat-
i i "76 aver as to our ntent ons. 
What taxes may be levied under this limitation? 
Sections 28 and 29 of the Constitution set absolute limits beyond 
which even the General Assembly cannot empower municipalities to tax. 
Section 28 authorizes taxes on the following: real, personal and aizad 
property; ''Merchants, Peddlers, and privileges"; ''Merchant's Capital 
uaed in the purchase of Merchandiae ·aold by him to non-residents and eent 
beyond the State" (taxable at ad valorem property tax rate); and incOlle 
from stocks and bonds. The only reference to a specific tax in Section 
29 is that "all property shall be taxed according to its value." Any 
taxes not classified by the courts as falling under any of these cate-
aeries may not be authorized by the General Assembly to any municipality • 
Section 29 provides that the "General Assembly shall have power to 
authorize the ••• incorporated towns ••• to impose taxes for • 
corporation purposes ••• in such a manner as shall be prescribed by lsw." 
There are few cases in Tennessee challenging the delegation of the tax-
ing power to municipalities, possibly because of the broad language "to 
blpose taxes" without any qualification whatsoever of the word "taxes." 
"The State ••• having full control of these agencies [municipalities] 
••• aay authorize such agents to levy a tax •••• 1177 However, Amend-
ment lo. 7 now limits the legislative power of delegation to those taxes 
76 Debates, p. 947. 
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"authorized by Sections 28 or 29," with a further restriction that no 
municipality may be authorized "to tax incomes, estates, or inheritances." 
.. · 
The prohibition against a tax on estates or inheritances appears to 
be insignificant; probably no municipality in the. United States levies 
such a tax. But removal of the authority "to tax incomes" could be more 
important. Would this prevent a Tennessee municipality from levying a 
"payroll tax" on all persons working within its city limits? In view of 
the fact that this type of tax has been imposed by many cities in other 
states and is viewed as an equitable, very productive aource of revenue 
by many municipal leaders, this question will be analyzed at some length. 
The language of Section 28 of Article II of the Tennessee Constitution 
is that "the Legislature shall have power to tax Merchants, Peddlers, and 
privileges, in such manner as they may from time to time direct." A long 
line of Tennessee cases have construed this provision as giving the General 
Assembly plenary power to tax "privileges." A few quotations will indi-
cate this trend. "We take it the word privilege was intended to designate 
a larger, perhaps an indefinite class of objects . . • occupation , • 
avocation, calling, or pursuit, all of which may be declared and have been 
so held privileges under our constitution. 11 78 "At the least, any occupa-
tion, business, employment, or the like affecting the public, aay be 
classed and taxed as a privilege. 1179 "A privilege is whatever the Legis-
lature choose to declare to be a privilege and to tax as auch. 1180 "The 
Legislature has unlimited, and unrestricted power to tax privileges, and 
78Phillips v. Lewis, 3 Shan. Cas. 230 (1877). 
79 Railroad v. Harris, 99 Tenn. 684, 43 S.W. 115, 53 L. R. A. 921 (1897). 
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this power may be exercised in any manner or mode in ite diacretiou,"81 
"In fact it has been said in two of our cases that, if thought proper, the 
Legislature might make the business of farming a privilege. , • , The 
term 'privilege' embraces any and all occupations that the Legislature aay 
in its discretion choose to declare a privilege and tax as such, 11 82 "The 
power to tax privileges is not subject to any constitutional limitation 
except that the tax levied must not be arbitrary, capricious or Wholly 
1 1183 unreasonab e. "Taxation of the privilege is upon the occc:~.-. t: '''· or 
activity carried on amid the social, economic, and industrial environment, 
1111der protection of the state. 1184 (underlining added). 
However, both by terms of Amendment No. 7 and prior judicial rulings, 
only the General Assembly may empower a municipality to tax privileges; 
wthe Legislature alone can create a privilege and authorize its taxation, 
mid , •• a municipal corporation cannot make any occupation a privilege, 
aor impose a tax upon it, unless it has first been so declared by the 
Leahlature."85 
We have seen in the foregoing cases that the General Assembly may 
usu a "privilege," and may authorize municipalities to tax as a "priv-
tlaae," any "occupation, avocation, calling, pursuit, business, employ-
-t, activity, or the like affecting the public," even the "business of 
8
1wilson v. State, 143 Tenn. 55, 224 S.W. 168 (1919) • 
82
seven Springs Water Co. v. Kennedy, 156 Tenn. l, 299 s.w. 792, 
5' A. L. R. 496 (1927), 
13 
Booten v. Carson, 186 Tenn. 282, 209 S.W.2d 273 (1948) • 
14 
lank of Commerce & Trust Co. v. Senter, 149 Tenn. 569, 260 S.W. 144 (1t23). 
15 
Trading Stamp Co. v. Memphis, 101 Tenn. 181, 47 s.w. 136 (1898). 
I 
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farming," and "whatever the Legislature choose to declare to be a priv-
ilege." Under this broad construction of the taxing power may the General 
Assembly authorize a municipality to impose a privilege tax on all pet1ons 
working in a city, measured by thei.r income or earnings? Of course the 
question immediately arises, "Is this not a tax on incomes, prohibited by 
the explicit terms of Amendment No. 7?" This precise question was consid-
ered in a Kentucky case, in a manner so pertinent that it is quoted ex-
tensively below: 
The Board of Aldermen of Louisville has imposed an 
annual tax or license fee for the privilege of engaging 
in any business, calling, profession or labor [actual . 
wording of the ordinance: "occupation, trade, profession, 
or other activity"] within the city, with certain excep-
tions. • . • The major attack •.• stems from the fact 
that the measure of the tax is the earnings from the ex-
ercise of the privileges being one per cent thereof. 
The validity of the ordinance is principally questioned 
upon the ground that it imposes an income tax in fact al-
though it designates the tax as a license fee. . •• the 
ordinance gathers within the sweep of its perimeter every-
body who earns any money in any occupation, trade or pro-
fession or in the conduct of any business within the limits 
of the city •.•• 
A munic1pality's power to tax is only that which the 
legislature has granted it. Section 181 of the Con-
stitution provides that the General Assembly may "delegate 
the power to •.• cities ••• to impose and collect li-
cense fees on ••• franchises, trades, occupations and 
professions." By an Act of 1948 • • • the General Assembly 
provided: "Cities of all classes are authorized to levy 
and collect any and all taxes provided for in Section 181 
of the Constitution" •••• "trades, occupations and pro-
fessions" • • • is as far-reaching and as sweeping as 
language could make it. It would be difficult to find 
three words that cover wider fields of employment • 
• • • that the right to earn a livelihood is an inalien-
able right guaranteed by the Bill of Rights of the Con-
stitution ••. is true may be conceded by all. However, 
the Bill of Rights does not operate to relieve from taxa-
tion. . . . 
• • • The principal storm center • • • is whether or 
not this ordinance imposes an income tax, the taxpayers' 
argument being that the city has no authority to levy such 
a tax. We need not pass upon the question of the existence 
or absence of that power. Confusion in the case may arise 
from placing so much emphasis on the measure of the tax as 
to subordinate or lose sight of its true character. • ·• • 
Since the levy is primarily for revenue, to speak with 
technical accuracy, the tax imposed is an "occupation tax." 
• • • This Louisville ordinance lays the tax upon the 
privilege of working and conducting a business within the 
city, and only measures the value of the privilege by the 
smount of earnings or net profits. It is contended that 
this is but a subterfuge [and] • • • it is but an income 
tax. • • • We • • • hold the tax is not an income tax. • 86 
The Louisville tax was austained as collectible from all employees 
67 
of the Federal government working in the city, including those at a Navel 
Ordinance Plant owned by and under the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
87 
Ontted States. 
If the foregoing line of cases is followed, the Tennessee Supreme 
Court could sustain a privilege tax on all businesses and persons work-
in& within a city, measured by net profits, income or earnings, on the 
around& that such a tax would be a tax on the privilege and not on the 
1DC09'e· On this basis it would not come within the purview of the words 
•co tu incomes" found in Amendment No. 7. Compare the following with 
U.. lentucky case: "It [Chapter 31, Public Acts of 1923] is said 
to illpo1e a direct tax on the incomes of corporations. • • the act 
illpoeH an excise tax [elsewhere in the opinion: "an excise tax is an 
t.Unct or privilege tax"] • • • the measure of the annual tax is a sum 
.. l&&l to 3 per centum of the net earnings for the preceding fiscal year. 
• • • the act is valid unless some other constitutional limitation bas 
s 
. ·: . . · 
··~·· ·;::. -· 
"1.ouisVille v. Sebree, 308 Ky. 420, 214 S.W.2d 248 (1948). 
17 
Cooke v, LouisVille, 312 Ky. 1, 226 S.W.2d 328 (1950). Howard v. 
1••ioners, 344 U.S. 624, 97 L.Ed. 617, 73 S.Ct. 465 (1953) • 
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been overstepped. "88 "Section 30 [of Article 2 of the Constitution) .• 
prohibits taxation upon the article manufactured of the produce of this 
State. • Section 30 does not inhibit the laying of a privilege:tax 
upon the occupation of selling such articles."89 It may also be noted that 
State privilege taxes on insurance companies are calculated as percentages 
90 of their gross receipts. 
Delegates in the Constitutional Convention expressed fears that dire 
consequences would flow from this amendment, and others tried to give 
reassurances. Opinions were so divided thst perhaps a consensua of inten-
tion of this point was not established. 
Mr. Pope thought that the clause, "the power of taxation of a munic-
ipality shall not be enlarged or increased except by general act," read 
in relation to the Article it would amend, would remove any prohibition 
on the Legislature "from passing an act levying an income tax on the people 
in municipalities, or authorizing them to do it, either one •• I don't 
think the gentlemen meant to do it, but it is in there, and it is clear."91 
Later, Mr. Pope observed, "They have undertaken to eliminate the ob-
jection by providing that the General Assembly shall not authorize any 
municipality to tax income, estates or inheritances, or to impose any 
other tax not authorized by Section 28 or 29 of Article II on the Consti-
tution. "92 Mr. Pope then quoted this part of Section 28: 
88 Bank of Commerce & Trust Co. v. Senter, supra. 
89 Kurth v. State, supra. 
90 
TCA 56-408 et seq. 
91Debates, p. 921. 
92Debates, p. 1020. 
No one species of property from which a tax iaay be 
collected, shall be taxed higher than any other speciea 
of property of the aame value, but the legislature •hall 
have power to tax merchants, peddlers and privileges, in 
1uch manner as they may from time to time direct. 
And he followed with these comments: 
Now, how has the Supreme Court of Tennessee construed 
that; the Supreme Court of Tennessee has said on nllllleroua 
occasions that the legislature has the power and the author-
ity to levy any tax that it sees fit on privileges, and we 
have a number of privilege taxes in Tennessee today, where 
the measure of the tax ia the income of the individual tax 
[.!!£]. 
• • . there· are a number of taxes in Tennessee exer-
cised by the legislature as a privilege tax; one is called 
an excise tax. What is the basis, what is the measure of· 
the assessment upon which that excise tax is fixed; it is 
the income of the party taxed. 
that is exactly what the excise tax is, it ia 
levied upon the grounds of being a privilege, and the meas-
ure of the tax, the methods on which the tax is calculated 
can be the income of the party taxed under that excise law. 
although the Supreme Court of Tennessee had said 
the legislature could not levy the income tax, it did sus-
tain this excise tax; it ~as three per cent upon the net 
profits of the Memphis Natural Gas Company; ••. after the 
case had gone to the Supreme Court of the United States, and 
there affirmed, having been first decided by our Supreme Court. 
Under this amendment, I say that the General Assembly 
of this State could authorize any town in the State coming 
under the home rule to enact, through its city council, an 
excise tax based upon a privilege, they could declare any-
thing they wanted to be a privilege, according to the Su-
preme Court of Tennessee; ••• anything, the Supreme Court 
aaid, can be levied as a privilege tax because the Consti-
tution does not prohibit it, and while it is not called an 
income tax . • • because the measure of the tax is the in-
come and of course the same applies to any other taxes, like 
sales taxes, and so forth.93 
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Another delegate, Mr. Miles, agreed: "Mr. Pope has talked consider-
~ly about the taxation feature of this proposed Sims amendment; I shall 
93 





not undertake to repeat, except to aay that I believe that Kr. Pope is 
right in every statement that he has made."94 Two other delegate•, how-
ever, disagreed: 
Kr. Ogle: Now, I am not an authority on taxation, 
and I don't purport to be, but I don't think that the evil 
he is trying to inject, or the fear that he is trying to 
inject, into this Co111nittee relative to taxes exists; and 
I don't think Kr. Pope deep down in his heart thinks it 
exists himself. I have talked to a few other people about 
the various evil taxes that could be imposed; these people 
are authorities in the field of taxation, and they have 
convinced me beyond a reasonable doubt that those evils 
would not be present if the Sims proposal were adopted. 
Kr. Ambrose: I listened with great interest to the 
opponents of this measure yesterday, and they delineated 
all of this new taxation that was going to be imposed upon 
us. . Now, they have been throwing the boogie-man in 
here; that has no place in this record.95 
To allay their fears, Kr. Killer said the following: 
I would not support any plan of home rule which would 
make it possible for the legislature to vest in our cities 
any powers of taxation which it cannot vest in the cities 
today under the present Constitution. Resolution No. 118 
[which later became Amendment No. 7) leaves to the legis-
lature the right to give the cities additional powers of 
taxation from time to time only by general laws, whereas to-
day additional powers of taxation can be given by special 
acts as well as by general law. That is an additional safe-
guard which we have in this resolution, and in addition, we 
have placed an absolute prohibition on certain kinds of taxes 
ever being vested in municipalities. For example, any in-
come tax, regardless of what the Supreme Court later holds 
in regard to an income tax, that right could not be vested 
in a city in view of this prohibition ••• ,96 
The following exchange in the Convention might be construed as an 
intention to place inspection fees beyond the reach of this prohibition: 
94oebates, p. 1028. 
95oebstes, pp. 1029, 1040. 
96oebates, p. 1045. 
I 
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Mr. Smith: In the proviso against taxation, I ltnow 
that you are and the delegates are familiar with inspec-
tion staffs which do not levy a tax, but collect the fee 
for inspectors, the police power, sanitation, garbage 
collection, and things of that sort; would that be con-
strued as a tax, or is that an inspection fee that the 
city would have the right under its police power to exact? 
Mr. Sims: Well, of course, every city has a right 
under its police power to provide for inspections; it can-
not produce revenue through that means; but under this 
provision, if the city elected not to come under home rule, 
then it would continue under its charter just as it is, 
and its charter would determine its power to levy local 
taxes, subject to the general statutes of the State which 
prohibit the imposition of certain types of taxes by cities. 
Mr. Smith: ·Well, am I correct that an inspection fee 
has been ruled not to be a tax? 
Mr. Sims: An inspection fee for police purposes has 
been ruled not to be a tax.97 
* * * 
Nothing herein shall be construed as 
invalidating the provisions of any 
municipal charter in existence at the 
time of the adoption of this amendment. 
' , 
Mr. Sims made this statement with respect to the foregoing: "That 
·• 
71 
wa. intended to leave no doubt as to what the legal situation would be in 
:rour municipalities if this amendment to the Constitution was adopted; it 
will not invalidate any provision in your charter • • • that is now in 
md.1tence. That was requested by the mayors of the cities. u98 This 
epparently is also a provision applicable to all municipalities, not just 
ct.oee electing "home rule" status. 
97Debates, p. 1014. 
98x>ebates, p. 908. 
' 
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At first glance this would appear to be a simple, unequivocal provi-
•ion about which no question would arise. However, a specific situation 
has indicated that its effect may not always be clear. A city with a pri-
vate act charter provision authori%ing annexation by ordinance wanted to 
know whether this was superseded and invalidated by the 1955 annexation 
law. Does the operation of this clause sustain the private act, against 
the preceding clause in Amendment No. 7: "The General Assembly shall by 
general law provide the exclusive methods •.•• by which municipal bound-
aries may be altered"? 
In 1955 the General Assembly enacted a general annexation law (Chapter 
113, Public Acts of 1955). If the foregoing part of this amendment is con-
strued to make Chapter 113 truly "exclusive" as to how "municipal boundarie; 
may be altered," in effect the charter provision for annexation by ordinanc. 
would be invalidated by a part of Amendment No. 7 (Chapter 113 declared a 
different legislative intention: "except as specifically provided in this 
Act, the powers conferred by this Act shall be in addition and supple-
mental to, and the limitations imposed by this Act shall not affect the 
powers conferred by any other general, special or local law.") 
Although a few such doubtful cases may arise, the general effect of 
this provision seems to have been clearly set forth in Mr. Sims' explana-
tion. In general, municipal charters as they existed on November 3, 1953, 










The experience with Amendment No. 6 seems to have been very ••tie-
factory. One would naturally expect that local officials would •pprove 
of the transfer of power effectuated by this amendment, and no complaint• 
• 
have been heard from them. No effort was made to determine Whether Stata 1 
officials have any objections; the appearance of occasional billa ai9ed 
at curbing or dfrecting actions of counties/cities is perhaps an indica-
tion of a residue of the prior system that lodged all power in the State 
legid•ture. 
The accompanying table analyzes the acts of four sessions--two 
~iennial in 1955 and 1965 (79th and 84th General Aasemblies), and two 
annual in 1973 and 1974 (the 88th General Assembly); totals are shown 
for the latter two sessions, for comparison with the data of the biennial 
.. s1ions. The number of acts for cities substantially dropped--81 in the 
t9ll annual sessions combined, as compared with 211 in 1955. County acts 
1hcwd a decline in 1965, but in the two annual sessions combined were 
laiahar (294) than the total of 271 in 1955. A very high proportion of 
tlM act• (85.6 to 97.6 per cent) called for approval by governing bodies, 
llDd mo•t of them received favorable action (from 59 per cent for counties 
ill 1955 to 94.3 per cent for cities in the •ame year); the approved nlllllher 
,... proportionately higher for citiea in every •ession. The experience 
~tis referendums was more divided--more county acts were disapproved in 
1155, and more city acts were turned down in 1974 (all six were charter 
:.:;"•t•.,h•nint• for the City of Crossville). 
--1-.: 





ANALYSIS OF APPROVAL ACTIONS ON PRIVATE ACTS 
1955, 1965, 1973 and 1974 
79th 84th 88th (1973-74) Governmental Unit and 











160 59.0 146 
55 20.3 37 
17 6.3 l 
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10 3. 7 9 








































































482 281 375 153 222 
To appraise the experience of the 13 cities that have adopted home 
rule status, 30 of their officials99 were contacted by telephone and asked 
to respond to five questions: 
1. Why did your city elect home rule status? 
2. Have you perceived any disadvantages of home rule status? 
3. Has your city considered repeal of home rule status? 
4. Do you recommend continuation of home rule status for your city? 
5. Has your city experienced any problems with alleged general 
acts that were private in effect (affecting only your city)? 
99seven mayors, fifteen city attorneys, four city managers (adminis-
trators), two members of governing bodies, and two city recorders; most of 
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. · . .:. ... -. 
Some officials could not respond to the first 
tenure began some time after adoption of home rule 
7.S 
quenio. '••i~: ••••• dleir 
statue, M"u·· W 
"allSVer this question, two-thirds (12) 
quire local control of the charter drafting and 
avoid dependence on the State legislature. The 
the purpose was to gain protection 
mented that this purpose would have 
status because of the local veto 
Six~-en felt that there are no disadvantages of home 
while 13 bad perceived one primary disadvantage: greater 
amendment by the referendum process. 
critical in several cities with charter provisions limiting 
of top officials. 
.··; 
Five respondents would recommend repeal of home rule status, but U ·_; 
favored continuation. Two cities have considered repeal, but in oul.7..,. 
-.... !. 4. .... ._ ..... 
city has any formal action been taken; the Chattanooga City CommiaaiOll·, :...:: 
folloving a recommendation by a Charter Study Committee, bas called for: a 
't'Ote in the November 1976 general election on whether to repeal h01De rule 
statue. 
The responses indicated that four cities have had some problems vitb 
8dftrae "general acts of local application" which were private in effect, 
1114 it was reported that several such acts bad been declared unconstitu-
tt .... •l by the courts. Three cities were not averse tc- accepting such 
~ that were beneficial to them. 
Although there are some negative aspects of home rule statua, as ...... 
· ~• 91;& .. 1a the foregoing summary, on balance the experience of Tennessee 
"' .. ~ .. sppean to be favorable. l'he principal problem seems to be one 
"" ·• 
76 
inherent in the democratic process: persuading the voters to approve 
charter changes. 
